C	ase 2:23-cv-07192-MCS-MAA	Document 8 #:110	Filed 09/22/23	Page 1 of 5	Page ID		
1	PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNE A Professional Corporation	YS					
2	Scott J. Ferrell, Bar No. 2020 sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.	91 .com					
3	A Professional Corporation Scott J. Ferrell, Bar No. 2020 sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys Victoria C. Knowles, Bar No. vknowles@pacifictrialattorne	277231 ys.com					
4	4100 Newport Place Drive, St Newport Beach, CA 92660	te. 800					
5 6	Tel: (949) 706-6464 Fax: (949) 706-6469						
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff						
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT						
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA						
10							
11	TANYA CANTU, individua	lly and on	Case No. 2:2	23-cv-07192-l	MCS-MAA		
12	behalf of all other similarly s	situated,	Assigned to	Judge Mark (C. Scarsı		
13	Plaintiff,			F'S NOTICE			
14	V.		PURSUAN	RY DISMIS F TO FEDEI	RAL RULE OF		
15	LUX GLOBAL INC., a Cali corporation d/b/a TOPLUX	fornia NUTRITION,	CIVIL PRO	CEDURE 4	1(a)(1)(A)(i)		
16	inclusive,			iled: April 28	, 2023		
17	Defendants.		Action Remo	iled: April 28 oved: August	30, 2023		
18							
19							
20							
21							
22							
23							
24							
25							
26							
27							
28							
		-	1 -				

1 TO THE COURT, CLERK AND ALL PARTIES OF RECORD, please take notice 2 that Plaintiff Tanya Cantu ("Plaintiff") respectfully requests dismissal of the instant 3 action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure *with* 4 *prejudice* as to the Plaintiff's individual claims, and *without prejudice* as to the putative 5 class. There has been no responsive pleading or motion filed, no class has been certified, 6 and there is no settlement or concession of class interests in order to resolve Plaintiff's 7 individual claims.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e), "the district court should inquire into possible prejudice
from (1) class members' possible reliance on the filing of the action if they are likely to
know of it either because of publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of adequate time
for class members to file other actions, because of a rapidly approaching statute of
limitations, (3) any settlement or concession of class interests made by the class
representative or counsel in order to further their own interests." *Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff contends the *Diaz* factors do not apply to the facts of this case, but even 15 if they did, dismissal is nonetheless proper. In 1989, the Ninth Circuit held in *Diaz* that 16 Rule 23(e) applies prior to class certification. 876 F.2d at 1408. At that time, Rule 23 17 provided that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the 18 approval of the court " Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (as amended Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 19 1987). Under Diaz, the district court evaluating dismissal is to "inquire into possible 20 prejudice from (1) class members' possible reliance on the filing of the action if they are 21 likely to know of it either because of publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of 22 adequate time for class members to file other actions, because of a rapidly approaching 23 24 statute of limitations, (3) any settlement or concession of class interests made by the class representative or counsel in order to further their own interests." 876 F.2d at 1408 25 (citations omitted). 26

Notably, *Diaz* was decided <u>prior</u> to amendments to Rule 23(e), which clarified that
Rule 23(e) applies to certified classes or settlement classes. Specifically, Rule 23(e) now

provides that "[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a *certified class*—or a *class proposed* 1 2 to be certified for purposes of settlement" may be settled or voluntarily dismissed "only with the court's approval." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (emphasis added); see also Lee v. CVS 3 Pharmacy, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-01923-BEN-DEB, 2021 WL 308283, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4 5 28, 2021) (acknowledging that "in 2003, the Congress revised Rule 23 to make clear that court approval is only required in a putative class action where the plaintiff seeks to 6 approve a settlement of both individual and class claims"); 7B Charles Alan Wright & 7 Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc., Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise of 8 9 Class Actions § 1797 (3d ed. 2021) ("settlements or voluntary dismissals that occur 10 before class certification are outside the scope of subdivision (e)"). Accordingly, because 11 no class has been certified and there is no settlement of any kind in this action, Rule 23(e) 12 does not apply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

13 Nevertheless, even if the Court were to apply the *Diaz* factors to these circumstances, dismissal would be proper. First, it is unlikely that any putative class 14 15 members have relied on the action to protect their interests given that the case is in its infancy and there are no circumstances suggesting reliance on Plaintiff's claims. This 16 action has not been publicized in any way and as such, the putative class members are 17 18 highly unlikely to have knowledge of it, or to have relied upon it in any way. Similarly, 19 Plaintiff's counsel is unaware of any other circumstances that may have led to the putative class's knowledge of, or reliance upon, this action. Second, just five months 20 have passed since the filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff's purchase at issue was in summer 21 of 2022 and as such, based on the three-year statute of limitations, the statute of 22 23 limitations shall not run until mid-2025. As such, the rights of the putative class are 24 preserved by the solely individual dismissal of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. *Third*, as discussed above, there is no settlement or concession of putative class interests given 25 26 that there has been no settlement or compromise of any kind related to any potential class 27 claims asserted in the Complaint. Indeed, the resolution reached between the Parties does

28

not address, affect, or change the putative class's rights or claims in any manner. Even
 under *Diaz*, dismissal is clearly proper here.

Plaintiff has diligently followed the rules to obtain a voluntary dismissal prior to any substantive response to the Complaint. *Diaz* should not stand as a barrier to dismissal, given the subsequent amendments to Rule 23(e) and the facts of this case in which there is no settlement or compromise of any class claims, no collusion, and no potential prejudice to any putative class member. Moreover, the dismissal as to any putative class members would be *without prejudice*.

9 For all the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter
10 a dismissal of this action *with prejudice* as to the named Plaintiff and *without prejudice*11 as to the putative class.

13		Respectfully submitted,
14	Dated: September 22, 2023	PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
15		By: <u>/s/ Scott J. Ferrell</u>
16		Scott J. Ferrell Attorney for Plaintiff
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

12

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that on September 22, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing	
3	PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO	
4	FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(a)(1)(A)(i) with the Clerk of the Court	
5	using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing via electronic mail to	
6	all counsel of record.	
7	<u>/s/ Scott J. Ferrell Esq.</u>	
8	Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.	
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18 19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	- 5 -	