С	ise 2:19-cv-10983-JFW-AFM Document 1 F	Filed 12/31/19 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:1				
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP LISA SIMONETTI (SBN 165996) ALEX LINHARDT (SBN 303669) 1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2121 Telephone: 310-586-7700 Facsimile: 310-586-7800 Email: simonettil@gtlaw.com linhardta@gtlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Walmart Inc. UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT				
10						
11						
12	JEREMIAH ADOLPHUS, individually	CASE NO. 2:19-CV-10983				
13	and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	DEFENDANT WALMART INC.'S				
14	Situated,	NOTICE OF REMOVAL PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)				
15	Plaintiff, v.	10 20 0.5.0. § 1002(u)(2)				
16						
17	WALMART INC.; and DOES 1 – 10, inclusive,	Removal Filed: December 31, 2019 State Action Filed: August 16, 2019				
18	Defendant.					
19						
20 21						
21 22						
22						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						
	NOTICE OF REMOVAL					

TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant Walmart Inc. ("Walmart") hereby removes the above-captioned action, *Jeremiah Adolphus v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,* Case No. 19STCV28638, from the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles to the United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(d), and 1446(b) on the grounds articulated below. Walmart hereby provides "a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).¹

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has original jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action 12 1. 13 Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). In relevant part, CAFA grants district courts original jurisdiction over civil class actions filed under federal or state law 14 in which any member of an alleged class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from 15 any defendant, where the putative class size exceeds 100 persons, and where the amount 16 placed in controversy for the putative class members in the aggregate exceeds the sum 17 or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. As set forth below, this case 18 meets all of CAFA's requirements for removal and is timely and properly removed by 19

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

²¹ ¹ A notice of removal "need not contain evidentiary submissions." Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 551 (2014); see also Arias v. 22 Residence Inn, 936 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (vacating remand order where district 23 court deprived defendant of a fair opportunity to submit proof after filing notice of removal); Janis v. Health Net, Inc., 472 F. App'x 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Nothing in 24 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires a removing defendant to attach evidence of the federal court's 25 jurisdiction to its notice of removal. Section 1446(a) requires merely a 'short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.""). Rather, "if the plaintiff contests the defendant's 26 allegation . . . both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the 27 evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied." Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 553-554. 28

the filing of this Notice.

VENUE

2. The action was filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Venue properly lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(a), 1391(a), and 1441(a).

SERVICE ON THE STATE COURT

3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), contemporaneously with the filing of the Notice in this Court, written notice of such filing will be given by the undersigned to Plaintiff's counsel of record and a copy of the Notice will be filed with the Clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

13

PLEADINGS, PROCESS, AND ORDERS

4. On or about August 16, 2019, plaintiff Jeremiah Adolphus ("Plaintiff"), on
behalf of himself and allegedly on behalf of others similarly situated, filed his Complaint
in this action. A true and correct copy of the Summons and Complaint filed in the Los
Angeles County Superior Court is attached hereto as <u>Exhibit A</u>.

5. On or about November 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
("FAC"). Walmart received service of the FAC on December 2, 2019. A true and correct
copy of the FAC filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court is attached hereto as
<u>Exhibit B.²</u>

6. On December 26, 2019, Walmart filed an Answer to the FAC. A true and
correct copy of the Answer filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court is attached
hereto as <u>Exhibit C</u>.

7. According to the FAC, Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class are
or were customers of Walmart with respect to the purchase of "Class Products." [FAC,

27

² In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), Walmart also attaches the remainder of the state court file as <u>Exhibit D</u>.

¶ 16.] By "Class Products," Plaintiff means bill paying services offered by non-party CheckFreePay. [Id., ¶3] Walmart serves as the agent for CheckFreePay in those services 2 by taking in bill payments, in the form of cash or debit cards transactions, and 3 transmitting those funds to CheckFreePay, which then pays the customers' bills. [Id., ¶¶ 4 5 26-28].

TIMELINESS OF THE REMOVAL

This removal is timely. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held, 8 8. CAFA removal is timely at any time so long as: (1) the face of the complaint does not 9 10 plainly allege all elements needed for traditional diversity (including the amount in 11 controversy), and (2) plaintiff has not served some other "paper" which concedes all elements needed for traditional diversity. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 12 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a removing defendant may remove 13 "on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the 14 thirty-day deadlines" set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3)); *id.* at 1126 ("[A] 15 defendant's subjective knowledge cannot convert a non-removable action into a 16 removable one such that the thirty-day time limit of \S 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) begins to run 17 against the defendant"); see also Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th 18 Cir. 2014) ("We also recently held in Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., that 19 the two 30-day periods are not the exclusive periods for removal In other words, 20 as long as the complaint or 'an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper' does 21 not reveal that the case is removable, the 30-day time period never starts to run and the 22 defendant may remove at any time."); Taylor v. Cox Commc'ns Cal., LLC, 2016 WL 23 7422717, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2016) ("We also hold that Defendants' second Notice 24 of Removal was timely. 'A CAFA case may be removed [by a defendant] at any time, 25 provided that neither of the two thirty-day periods under § 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) has 26 been triggered.""). 27

28

9.

1

6

7

Here, neither the Complaint nor the FAC plainly alleges all elements

needed for removal, and Plaintiff has not served some other "paper" that concedes all
 elements needed for removal. For example, no amount in controversy is, or has been,
 stated in any paper received from Plaintiff.³

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO CAFA

10. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and this case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Specifically, this is a putative civil class action wherein: (1) the proposed class contains at least 100 members; (2) no defendant is a state, state official, or other governmental entity; (3) the total amount in controversy for all class members exceeds \$5,000,000; and (4) there is diversity between at least one putative class member and one defendant. CAFA authorizes removal of such actions in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

13

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

The Proposed Class Contains At Least 100 Members

Walmart Is Not a Governmental Entity

Minimum Diversity Exists

CAFA's diversity requirement is satisfied when at least one putative class

Walmart is not a state, state official, or other governmental entity.

member is a citizen of a state of which a defendant is not a citizen. 28 U.S.C. §§

14 11. Plaintiff alleges that he brings this action on behalf of himself and "[a]ll
15 consumers, who, between the applicable statute of limitations and the present, purchased
16 Class Products and whose Class Products did not properly transfer the funds." [FAC, ¶
17 55.] Plaintiff's claims focus on bill payments processed through Walmart and
18 CheckFreePay that allegedly were rejected by creditors, and Plaintiff alleges that "the
19 proposed class is composed of thousands of persons." [*Id.*, ¶ 59.]

- 20
- 21

12.

13.

1332(d)(2), 1453.

- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25 26

 ²⁷ ³ Even if the FAC had alleged all elements needed for removal, such as an estimate of the amount in controversy, this removal would be timely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3) because Walmart received service of the FAC on December 2, 2019.

1

For diversity purposes, a corporation "shall be deemed a citizen of any State 14. by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of 2 business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). To determine a corporation's principal place of 3 business, courts apply the "nerve center" test, which deems the principal place of 4 business to be the state in which the corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate 5 the corporation's activities. The Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010); 6 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 465 (2018). A corporation's principal place of 7 business will typically be where the corporation maintains its headquarters. Hertz, 130 8 S. Ct. at 1192. 9

15. Here, as Plaintiff alleges in the FAC, Walmart is a corporation incorporated 10 under the laws of the State of Delaware, and has its corporate headquarters, where its 11 officers reside and direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities, in the State 12 of Arkansas. [FAC, ¶ 2, 21.] Thus, Walmart is a citizen of the State of Delaware, where 13 it is incorporated, and the State of Arkansas, where it has its principal place of business. 14

For CAFA removal, "[c]itizenship of the members of the proposed plaintiff 16. 15 classes shall be determined . . . as of the date of filing of the complaint or amended 16 complaint, or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not subject to Federal 17 jurisdiction, as of the date of service by plaintiffs of an amended pleading, motion, or 18 other paper, indicating the existence of Federal jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7). 19

20. Whether measured as of the date of Plaintiff's filing of the Complaint or 20 FAC, minimal diversity is satisfied. At the time of the filing of the Complaint and as of 21 the time of the filing of the FAC, one or more members of the putative class were and 22 are citizens of a state other than Delaware and Arkansas (the states of citizenship of 23 Walmart). Meanwhile, Plaintiff was and is a citizen and resident of the State of 24 California. [FAC, ¶ 16.] Plaintiff further alleges additional facts supporting minimal 25 diversity, including that Walmart advertised to consumers in California, that Walmart 26 purportedly violated California law based on those advertisements, and that Plaintiff is 27 a putative class member. [Id., ¶ 20.] 28

<u>The Amount in Controversy on the Putative Class Claims</u> <u>Exceeds \$5,000,000</u>

This jurisdictional element concerns "what amount is put 'in controversy' 3 21. by the plaintiff's complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe." Korn, Korn v. Polo 4 Ralph Lauren Corporation, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting 5 Rippee v. Boston Market Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005)). "In 6 measuring the amount in controversy, 'a court must assume that the allegations of the 7 complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all 8 claims made in the complaint." Korn, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (quoting Kenneth 9 Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 10 2002). The analysis includes potential general and special damages, and penalties, as 11 well as attorneys' fees if recoverable by statute or contract. See, e.g., Richmond v. 12 Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 449-450 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Miller v. Michigan Millers 13 Ins. Co., 1997 WL 136242 at *4-5 (N.D. Cal., 1997); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)-(e), 1453, 14 1711-1715. 15

22. Moreover, in calculating the amount placed in controversy, defenses that a 16 defendant may assert — such as a statute of limitation — are not considered. See Riggins 17 v. Riggins, 415 F.2d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he possibility of such a defense 18 being valid does not affect the jurisdiction of the district court to hear and determine the 19 controversy"); Hernandez v. Towne Park, Ltd., 2012 WL 2373372, at *10 (C.D. Cal., 20 June 22, 2012) ("the fact that [defendant] may assert a limitations defense does not limit 21 the relief sought in the complaint"); Lara v. Trimac Transp. Servs. (Western) Inc., 2010 22 WL 3119366, at *3 (C.D. Cal., August 6, 2010) ("affirmative defenses . . . may not be 23 invoked to demonstrate that the amount in controversy is actually less than the 24 jurisdictional limits."). 25

26 23. Though Walmart concedes no liability on Plaintiff's claims whatsoever,
 27 assuming for purposes of removal that all of Plaintiff's allegations are true and that

28

1

2

Plaintiff will gain a full recovery on them, Plaintiff's putative class claims place in
 controversy a sum greater than \$5,000,000.

24. In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) violation of the False
Advertising Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, *et seq.*); (2) violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*); and (3) violation of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1770, *et seq.*). Plaintiff pursues all
claims on behalf of the putative class.

25. In support of the asserted claims, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that 8 Walmart "is engaged in selling and providing payment services through [non-party] 9 CheckFreePay." [FAC, ¶ 2.] According to the FAC, based on advertising from and 10 representations made by Walmart, Walmart customers purchase CheckFreePay's bill-11 payment services "under the impression that [Walmart] would assist in facilitating a 12 payment to a third party" on customers' behalf. [Id., ¶ 6.] For example, Plaintiff states 13 that he provided funds to Walmart to purchase bill-payment services through 14 CheckFreePay "to pay for his monthly mortgage to his mortgage provider," but his 15 payments were rejected and he was not notified. [Id., ¶¶ 3, 26.] Plaintiff thus alleges that 16 Walmart "has violated California consumer protection statutes, including the Unfair 17 Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and the Consumer[s] Legal Remedies Act." 18 [Id.] The statute of limitations on the Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising 19 Law claims is four years, and the statute of limitations on the Consumers Legal 20 Remedies Act claim is three years. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208; Cal. Civ. Code 21 § 1783. 22

23 26. As a result of the alleged practices, Plaintiff seeks "disgorgement and 24 restitution to Plaintiff and all Class Members [of] Defendant's revenues associated with 25 their false advertising, or such portion of those revenues as the Court may find 26 equitable." [*Id.*, ¶ 79.] Plaintiff also seeks damages and punitive damages, as well as all 27 reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs. [*Id.*, ¶ 102.]

28

1 27. <u>Restitution and Disgorgement/Damages</u>. Without admitting that Plaintiff is 2 entitled to any monetary relief, Walmart understands third-party payees may have 3 declined more than \$5 million in payments attempted to be made through bill payment 4 services provided by CheckFreePay for persons in California during the period from 5 January 2016 to October 2019.

Other Unquantified Claims for Monetary Relief. Plaintiff also seeks relief
for "suffer[ing] emotional distress, wasted time, loss of money, and anxiety," and
punitive damages, as noted. [*Id.*, ¶ 40.] These claims place in controversy still greater
sums. *See, e.g., Kroske v. US Bank Corp.*, 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (emotional
distress damages may be considered in determining amount in controversy); *Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.*, 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is well established that punitive
damages are part of the amount in controversy in a civil action.").

Prospective Injunctive Relief. In addition, Plaintiff seeks classwide 29. 13 prospective injunctive relief and declaratory relief barring future alleged wrongdoing 14 and damage. "In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established 15 that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation." 16 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); Luna v. 17 Kemira Specialty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (same). The 18 "amount in controversy" requirement is satisfied where either plaintiff can gain or 19 defendant can lose the jurisdictional amount. See In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (South 20 Dakota), 264 F. 3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that, for purposes of calculating 21 amount in controversy, "[t]he value of the thing sought to be accomplished by the action 22 may be related to either or any party to the action"). Here, Plaintiff seeks an "order 23 requiring [Walmart], at its own cost, to notify all Class Members of the unlawful and 24 deceptive conduct," as well as an "order requiring [Walmart] to engage in corrective 25 advertising regarding the conduct." [FAC, ¶ 102.] Plaintiff's request for prospective 26 injunctive relief thus increases the amount placed in controversy on the claims. 27

28

30. Attorneys' Fees Through the Life of the Litigation. Further still, Plaintiff 1 seeks classwide recovery of statutory attorneys' fees. The amount in controversy 2 includes all reasonable attorneys' fees not merely through the date of removal, but 3 through resolution of the action. See Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 4 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("Plaintiff insists that attorneys' fees are limited to those accrued at 5 time of removal, maintaining that additional fees are too speculative. Plaintiff is 6 mistaken. [The] Ninth Circuit [has] clearly . . . anticipated that district courts would 7 project fees beyond removal."); Ponce v. Med. Eveglass Ctr., Inc., 2015 WL 4554336, 8 at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (holding that "the [c]ourt agrees with defendant that a 9 conservative estimate of attorneys' fees likely to be incurred through the conclusion of 10 this case properly factors into the amount in controversy determination"); Sasso v. Noble 11 Utah Long Beach, LLC, 2015 WL 898468, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (holding 12 attorneys' fees through trial are properly included in amount in controversy 13 consideration; "post-removal attorneys' fees . . . are part of the 'total amount at stake""); 14 Sawyer v. Retail Data, LLC, 2015 WL 3929695, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2015) (same).⁴ 15

- 16
- 17

18

31. Through this Notice, Walmart does not admit any liability whatsoever to Plaintiff or to the proposed class, does not admit that Plaintiff is an adequate class

NO ADMISSIONS

19

⁴ See also Pulera v. F&B, Inc., 2008 WL 3863489, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ("While 20 the amount in controversy is determined at the time an action commences, where 21 attorney's fees are recoverable by statute, this determination includes a reasonable estimate of the attorney's fees likely to be incurred."); Brady v. Mercedes-Benz, 243 F. 22 Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2002), ("[w]here the law entitles the prevailing plaintiff 23 to recover reasonable attorney fees, a reasonable estimate of fees likely to be incurred to resolution is part of the benefit permissibly sought by the plaintiff and thus contributes 24 to the amount in controversy."); Tompkins v. Basic Research LLC, 2008 WL 1808316, 25 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (the "amount in controversy includes a reasonable estimate of attorneys' fees likely to be incurred"); Celestino v. Renal Advantage Inc., 2007 WL 26 1223699, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("the amount in controversy includes not only damages 27 accrued up to the time of removal, but also a reasonable assessment of damages likely to be accrued after the time of removal"). 28

representative for the proposed class, and does not admit that Plaintiff or the putative
class members are entitled to recover any form of monetary or injunctive relief. Walmart
also in no way admits that the instant action satisfies the requirements for class
certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this action
meets all of CAFA's requirements for removal.

6	32.	WHEREFORE, the a	ction is hereby	removed to	o this	Court	from	the	Los
7	Angeles Co	unty Superior Court.							

8						
9	F	Respectfully submitted,				
10						
11	Dated: December 31, 2019	GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP				
12						
13	T T	Den // Ling M. Simon 44				
14		By: <u>/s/ Lisa M. Simonetti</u> Lisa Simonetti				
15		Alex Linhardt				
16	l A	Attorneys for Defendant Walmart Inc.				
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						
		10				
	NOTICE OF REMOVAL					