

1 ROBERT A. COCCHIA (SBN 172315)
robert.cocchia@dentons.com
2 PETER Z. STOCKBURGER (SBN 265750)
peter.stockburger@dentons.com
3 DENTONS US LLP
4655 Executive Drive, Suite 700
4 San Diego, CA 92121
Telephone: (619) 236-1414
5 Facsimile: (619) 232-8311

6 Attorneys for Defendant
Condé Nast Entertainment LLC
7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11 SAUL GRANILLO and JENNIFER
FITE, individually and on behalf of all
12 others similarly situated,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

15 CONDE NAST ENTERTAINMENT
LLC, a Delaware limited liability
16 company; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

17 Defendant.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Case No. '19CV2104 BEN JLB

San Diego County Superior Court Case
No. 37-2019-00051411-CU-BT-CTL

**DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF
REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1441(a), 1446**

1 TO THE CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA:

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Condé Nast Entertainment LLC¹
4 (“Condé Nast” or “Defendant”) removes this action from the Superior Court of the State
5 of California, County of San Diego, to the United States District Court for the Southern
6 District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1441(a), and 1446.

7 **LIMITED PURPOSE**

8 1. The filing of this Notice does not, in any way, waive any right, privilege,
9 immunity, or defense Condé Nast may have under any applicable law relating to the
10 claims asserted in this matter. By filing this Notice, Condé Nast does not concede that
11 Plaintiffs Saul Granillo (“Granillo”) or Jennifer Fite’s (“Fite”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
12 or the putative class’ claims have merit. Specifically, by filing this Notice, Condé Nast
13 does not concede that any “automatic subscription” programs referred to herein constitute
14 an “automatic renewal” or “continuous service” offer pursuant to Business and
15 Professions Code § 17600, *et seq.*

16 **BACKGROUND**

17 2. Granillo alleges that on or about July 2017 he responded to an online offer
18 from Condé Nast to receive six issues of *Vogue* magazine for \$6.00. Declaration of Peter
19 Z. Stockburger (“Stockburger Dec.”) at ¶ 2, Exhibit (“Ex.”) A, Complaint (“Compl.”) at
20 ¶ 15. Granillo alleges he agreed to the offer and submitted his debit card information
21 online to complete the purchase. *Id.* Granillo alleges Condé Nast subsequently charged
22 his debit card \$6.00 for the six issues. *Id.* Granillo alleges that upon submission of the
23 order for six issues of *Vogue*, Condé Nast enrolled him into an automatic subscription
24 program without his knowledge or consent. *Id.* at ¶ 17. Pursuant to that program, Granillo

25 _____
26 ¹ Condé Nast Entertainment LLC, the named defendant in this matter, is a wholly-owned
27 subsidiary of Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. d/b/a Condé Nast (“AMPI”). AMPI is
28 the publisher of the magazines at issue in this lawsuit. Declaration of Matthew Hoffmeyer
 (“Hoffmeyer Dec.”) at ¶ 2. For the purposes of this Notice only, the two entities are
collectively referred to as Condé Nast.

1 alleges that in or about November 2017 Condé Nast posted an additional charge to
2 Granillo’s debit card in the amount of \$21.99 without Granillo’s authorization. *Id.* at ¶
3 16.

4 3. Fite alleges that in or about August 2017 she provided Condé Nast with her
5 credit card details to pay for a one-year subscription to *Vanity Fair* magazine at a cost of
6 \$5.00. *Id.* at ¶ 19. Fite alleges that upon submission of the order for a one-year
7 subscription of *Vanity Fair*, she also was enrolled into an automatic subscription renewal
8 program without her knowledge or consent. *Id.* at ¶ 21. Fite alleges that in or about
9 September 2018 she was charged an additional \$12.00 as part of the alleged automatic
10 subscription program. *Id.* at ¶ 20.

11 4. Plaintiffs filed a class action Complaint against Condé Nast on September
12 27, 2019 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego
13 (“Complaint”), entitled *Granillo v. Conde Nast Entertainment LLC*, Case Number 37-
14 2019-00051411-CU-BT-CTL (“State Court Action”). Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A,
15 Compl. Plaintiffs provided a copy of the Complaint to Condé Nast on or about October 2,
16 2019. *Id.* at ¶ 5, Ex. D.

17 5. Plaintiffs claim Condé Nast violated California law by enrolling them and
18 putative class members in an automatic subscription program without adequate notice
19 and consent. Plaintiffs assert four causes of action against Condé Nast on a putative class
20 basis: (1) violation of the California Automatic Renewal Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
21 §§ 17600, *et seq.* (“ARL”) (Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, ¶¶ 1, 33-37); (2) violation of
22 the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, *et seq.*
23 (“CLRA”) (Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, ¶¶ 1, 38-43); (3) violation of the California
24 Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* (“UCL”) (Stockburger
25 Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, ¶¶ 1, 44-52); and (4) for unjust enrichment (*id.* at ¶¶ 53-55).

26 6. Plaintiffs define the putative class as “[a]ll individuals in California who,
27 within the applicable limitations period, were enrolled by [Condé Nast] in an automatic
28 renewal or continuous service program[.]” (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) For the purposes of this Notice,

1 the applicable statute of limitations is four years from the date of the filing the Complaint
2 - i.e., September 27, 2015 to the present. Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶ 36
3 (alleging a four year statute of limitations); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a) (action upon a
4 liability created by statute is three years); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (statute of
5 limitations for claims brought under the UCL is four years). Plaintiffs seek the return of
6 all initial and automatic subscription fees and charges, and an award of attorneys’ fees.
7 Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶¶ 36, 51, 54, Prayer.

8 **TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL**

9 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) generally requires that a notice of removal be filed
10 within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant of a copy of the original pleading setting
11 forth the claim for relief upon which such action is based. Plaintiffs provided Condé Nast
12 with a copy of the Complaint on or about October 2, 2019. Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 5, Ex. D.
13 The deadline to file a notice of removal is therefore November 1, 2019, and this Notice
14 is timely.

15 **VENUE**

16 8. Venue is proper in this Court because Plaintiffs filed this matter in the
17 Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, which lies within the
18 Southern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(d), 1441(a). Venue is also appropriate
19 because Plaintiffs allege they reside in San Diego County and that the “complained of
20 conduct” occurred in San Diego County. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2); Stockburger Dec. at
21 ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶¶ 2-3, 6.

22 **JURISDICTION**

23 9. The State Court Action is a civil action over which this Court has original
24 jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)
25 (“CAFA”). CAFA provides “original jurisdiction” to this Court to hear a putative class
26 action if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the
27 matter in controversy “exceeds the sum value of \$5,000,000.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
28 (d)(5). A class action that meets CAFA standards may be removed to federal court.

1 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

2 10. Congress intended CAFA jurisdiction to be “interpreted expansively.”
3 *Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc.*, 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, unlike
4 other removal cases, “no antiremoval presumption attends cases involving CAFA.” *Dart*
5 *Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens*, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). The burden of
6 establishing removal jurisdiction is on the removing party. *Washington v. Chimel Innolux*
7 *Corp.*, 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011).

8 11. As set forth below, the State Court Action is a civil action that may be
9 removed pursuant to CAFA because (1) the putative class has more than 100 putative
10 class members; (2) minimal diversity exists between Plaintiffs and Condé Nast; and (3)
11 the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000 exclusive of interest and cost. 28 U.S.C.
12 §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5); *Bryant v. NCR Corp.*, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018).

13 PUTATIVE CLASS SIZE

14 12. Plaintiffs define the putative class as “[a]ll individuals in California who,
15 within the applicable limitations period, were enrolled by [Condé Nast] in an automatic
16 renewal or continuous service program.” Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶ 25.
17 The applicable statute of limitations for the purpose of this Notice is September 27, 2015
18 to the present. Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶ 36 (alleging a four year statute
19 of limitations); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a) (action upon a liability created by statute
20 is three years); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (statute of limitations for claims brought
21 under the UCL is four years).

22 13. Based on a review of Condé Nast’s records, the total number of putative
23 class members in California who were enrolled by Condé Nast in an alleged “automatic
24 renewal or continuous service program” for a Condé Nast publication during the relevant
25 time period is over 150,000, well beyond the 100 class member threshold. Hoffmeyer
26 Dec. at ¶ 8.

27 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

28 14. Minimal diversity under CAFA means that “any member of a class of

1 plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
2 “A party’s allegation of minimal diversity may be based on ‘information and belief.’”
3 and “[t]he pleading ‘need not contain evidentiary submissions.’” *Ehrman v. Cox Comms.*,
4 932 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 2019). *Ehrman v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc.*, 932 F.3d 1223,
5 1227 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc.*, 741 F.3d 1082,
6 1087 (9th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, and “[t]he pleading ‘need not contain evidentiary
7 submissions.’” *Id.* (quoting *Dart Cherokee*, 574 U.S. at 84).

8 Plaintiffs’ Citizenship

9 15. Plaintiffs are the only named plaintiffs in the Complaint. Both allege they
10 are individuals residing in San Diego County[.]” Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl.
11 at ¶¶ 2-3. Upon information and belief, they are both also domiciled in California.
12 Hoffmeyer Dec. at ¶ 6.

13 16. A natural person’s state of citizenship is determined by his or her state of
14 domicile. *Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.*, 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). A person’s
15 domicile is his or her permanent home, “where [he or] she resides with the intention to
16 remain or to which [he or] she intends to return.” *Id.* Although the Ninth Circuit has yet
17 to formally adopt the so-called “residence presumption” (see *Mondragon v. Capital One*
18 *Auto Fin.*, 736 F.3d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 2013); see also *Jes Solar Co. Ltd. v. Ton Soo*
19 *Chung*, 725 F. App’x 467, 469 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2018)), numerous courts treat a party’s
20 residence as *prima facie* evidence of his or her domicile. See, e.g., *Anderson v. Watts*,
21 138 U.S. 694, 705-06 (1891); *State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer*, 19 F.3d 514, 520
22 (10th Cir. 1994); *Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co.*, 654 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir.
23 2011); *Zoroastrian Ctr. & Darb-E-Mehr of Metro. Wash., D.C. v. Rustam Guiv Co.*,
24 822 F.3d 739, 750 n.6 (4th Cir. 2016).

25 17. Plaintiffs allege they are residents of California (Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2,
26 Ex. A, Compl. at ¶¶ 2-3), and Condé Nast alleges upon information and belief they are
27 domiciled in California (Hoffmeyer Dec. at ¶ 6). Based on the residence presumption,
28 Plaintiffs are citizens of California for the purposes of this Notice.

Condé Nast's Citizenship

1
2 18. Condé Nast Entertainment LLC is the named defendant in this suit. Condé
3 Nast Entertainment LLC is a limited liability company. Condé Nast Entertainment LLC
4 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMPI, the publisher of the magazines at issue in this
5 case. Hoffmeyer Dec. at ¶ 2. Thus, for the purposes of this Notice, the citizenship of
6 Condé Nast will be analyzed from both an LLC and corporate perspective.

7 19. Regarding unincorporated associations, such as an LLC, CAFA provides
8 that such associations “shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its
9 principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.” 28 U.S.C.
10 § 1332(d)(10); *Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A.*, 557 F.3d 1026, 1032 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009)
11 (citing § 1332(d)(10) and noting that “[f]or qualifying class actions . . . , CAFA abrogates
12 the traditional rule that an unincorporated association shares the citizenship of each of its
13 members for diversity purposes.”).²

14 20. Applying the 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) citizenship test to Condé Nast
15 Entertainment LLC, the named defendant, Condé Nast Entertainment LLC is organized
16 under the laws of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in New York.
17 Hoffmeyer Dec. at ¶ 5. Thus, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10), Condé Nast
18 Entertainment LLC is a citizen of both Delaware and New York.

19 21. For AMPI, the parent company of Condé Nast Entertainment LLC and the
20

21 ² In the Ninth Circuit, whether an LLC is an “unincorporated association” for CAFA
22 purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) remains an open question. The Fourth Circuit,
23 the only federal circuit to resolve the issue, offers persuasive guidance. In *Ferrell v.*
24 *Express Check Advance of SC LLC*, 591 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2010), the Fourth Circuit
25 expressly held that an LLC is properly considered an “unincorporated association” within
26 the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) “and therefore is a citizen of the State under
27 whose laws it is organized and the State where it has its principal place of business.” *Id.*
28 at 700. Most courts to consider the issue have reached the same conclusion, including the
Southern District of California. See, e.g., *Marroquin v. Wells Fargo, LLC*, 2011 WL
476540, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (treating an LLC as an unincorporated association
under CAFA); *Ramirez v. Carefusion Resources, LLC*, 2019 WL 2897902, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. July 5, 2019).

1 publisher of the magazines at issue in this case, the analysis turns on the “principal place
2 of business” test for corporations. For a corporation, the phrase “principal place of
3 business” refers to the place where its “officers direct, control, and coordinate” the
4 entity’s activities. *Hertz Corp. v. Friend*, 559 U.S. 77, 92 (2010). In practice, this is
5 “normally. . . the place where the [entity] maintains its headquarters – provided that the
6 headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve
7 center,’ and not simply an office where the [entity] holds its board meetings. . . .” *Id.*
8 at 79. AMPI is incorporated in New York and headquartered in New York City, where
9 AMPI’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the company’s activities. Hoffmeyer Dec.
10 at ¶ 4.

11 22. Based on the foregoing, regardless of whether the Court considers Condé
12 Nast Entertainment LLC or AMPI as the appropriate entity for the purposes of this
13 Notice, the result is the same. Condé Nast Entertainment LLC is a citizen of both
14 Delaware and New York. AMPI is a citizen of New York. Both entities are minimally
15 diverse from Plaintiffs, who are citizens of California.

16 23. Accordingly, there is minimal diversity between Plaintiffs and Condé Nast.

17 AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

18 24. A “removing defendant need only include a plausible allegation that the
19 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold [under CAFA], and the
20 defendant’s amount in controversy should be accepted if not contested by the plaintiff or
21 questioned by the court.” *Bryant*, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1149. Under this standard, Condé
22 Nast need only establish that the “potential damages could exceed the jurisdictional
23 amount.” *Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc.*, 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
24 quotations and citations omitted). This “burden is not daunting and only requires that the
25 defendant provide evidence establishing that it is *more likely than not* that the amount in
26 controversy exceeds [\$5 million].” *Varsam v. Lab. Corp. of Am.*, 2015 WL 4199287, at
27 *2 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in
28 original). Claims regarding the amount in controversy under a preponderance of the

1 evidence standard should be “tested by consideration of real evidence and the reality of
2 what is at stake in the litigation, using reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant’s
3 theory of damages exposure.” *Ibarra*, 775 F.3d at 1198.

4 25. Although Plaintiffs do not specify how much they seek in restitution (see
5 Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶¶ 51, 54, Prayer), the evidence demonstrates
6 that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy relating to restitution will
7 exceed the \$5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold.

8 26. Plaintiffs allege a putative class of all individuals in California who,
9 between September 27, 2015 and the present, were enrolled in a Condé Nast “automatic
10 renewal or continuous service program” for one of Condé Nast’s publications.
11 Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶ 25. Based on a review of subscriber records,
12 the total number of putative class members under this definition is over 150,000.
13 Hoffmeyer Dec. at ¶¶ 7-8. Of those individuals, the total amount paid during the relevant
14 time period for an initial subscription fee was over \$2,000,000. *Id.* The total amount paid
15 for subsequent renewal subscriptions was over \$17,000,000, well exceeding the
16 jurisdictional threshold. *Id.*

17 27. Plaintiffs seek an order returning all moneys paid to Condé Nast by putative
18 class members during the relevant time period, including the original subscription fee
19 and any automatic renewal charges. See Stockburger Dec. at ¶ 2, Ex. A, Compl. at ¶ 18
20 (“If Granillo had known that Defendants were going to enroll him in an automatic
21 renewal or continuous service program, he would not have responded to the offer for
22 *Vogue* and would not have paid any money to Defendants”), Compl. at ¶ 22 (“If Fite had
23 known that Defendants were going to enroll her in an automatic renewal or continuous
24 service program, she would not have submitted the order for *Vanity Fair* and would not
25 have paid any money to Defendants”), Compl. at ¶ 35 (“Plaintiffs have suffered injury in
26 fact and lost money as a result of Defendants’ violations of the ARL), Compl. at ¶ 36
27 (“Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to restitution of all amounts that Defendants
28 charged to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ credit cards, debit cards, or third-party

1 payment accounts during the four years preceding the filing of this Complaint and
2 continuing until Defendants’ statutory violations cease”), Compl. at ¶ 50 (“Plaintiffs have
3 suffered injury in fact and lost money as a result of Defendants’ acts of unfair
4 competition), Compl. at ¶ 51 (“Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to an order:
5 (1) requiring Defendants to make restitution to Plaintiffs and Class members”), Compl.
6 at ¶ 54 (“Defendants should be ordered to restore said funds to Plaintiffs and Class
7 members”), Prayer (seeking restitution). Plaintiffs therefore are seeking an order
8 demanding restitution of at least approximately \$20,000,000.

9 28. Although the amounts the named Plaintiffs themselves will seek in
10 restitution will be much smaller, the approximate \$20,000,000+ figure is not surprising
11 considering the size of the putative class. Indeed, at least one verdict in a case that
12 similarly alleged violations of the ARL, CLRA and UCL yielded a jury verdict of
13 \$20,629,000 in restitution. See, e.g., *Habelito v. Guthy-Renker L.L.C.*, 2017 WL 9939712
14 (Sup. Ct. Los Angeles June 23, 2017).

15 29. Based on the foregoing, the amount in controversy will more likely than not
16 exceed the \$5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold based on Plaintiffs’ request for restitution
17 alone.

18 **COMPLIANCE WITH 28 U.S.C. § 1446**

19 30. No previous application has been made for the relief requested herein.

20 31. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), copies of all process, pleadings, and
21 orders served on Condé Nast are attached with this Notice. Stockburger Dec. at ¶¶ 2-6,
22 Exs. A-E.

23 32. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Defendants will serve on Plaintiffs and
24 will file with the Clerk of the Superior Court for the County of San Diego a written
25 “Notice to the Clerk of the San Diego Superior Court and Plaintiffs of Filing of Notice
26 of Removal of Civil Action to Federal Court,” attaching a copy of this Notice of
27 Removal and all supporting papers.

28

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

DATED: November 1, 2019

DENTONS US LLP

By: s/Peter Z. Stockburger
PETER Z. STOCKBURGER

Attorneys for Defendant
Condé Nast Entertainment LLC
E-mail: peter.stockburger@dentons.com