

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA ROSILLO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ANNIE'S HOMEGROWN INC., et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02474-JSW

**ORDER STAYING CASE AND
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE**

Re: Dkt. No. 35

Now before the Court for consideration is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint. While Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim, they alternatively argue that the Court should stay this action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Court has carefully considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and record in this case, and the Court finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. *See* N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court STAYS this case pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice to Defendants renewing the motion once the stay is lifted.

BACKGROUND

Defendants Annie's Homegrown Inc. and General Mills, Inc. ("Defendants") manufacture, market, and distribute "Annie's Naturals" products throughout the United States. (Dkt. No. 25, First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 9-10.) The primary focus of the Annie's Naturals product line is that they are "natural" and therefore better than non-natural products. (*Id.* ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants market the Annie's Naturals product in this way in an attempt to "capitalize" on the growing market for natural products and, specifically, consumers' willingness to pay a price premium for such products. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs assert that Defendants market the

United States District Court
Northern District of California

1 Annie's Naturals products as "natural" by including the words "Annie's Naturals" on two places
2 on the front of the packaging and once on the back. (*Id.* ¶ 19.)

3 Contrary to the "natural" representation, Plaintiffs state that the Annie's Naturals products
4 actually contain "synthetic and highly chemically processed ingredients" such as "xanthan gum."
5 (*Id.* ¶¶ 20, 21.) "Xanthan gum" is a "thickening agent that, according [to] the FDA regulations, is
6 a synthetic substance." (*Id.* ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs assert that xanthan gum is not "natural" but is
7 "instead manufactured through fermentation or carbohydrates and subsequent treatment of the
8 byproduct with isopropyl alcohol." (*Id.*) Because Annie's Naturals products allegedly contain
9 such "non-natural" ingredients, Plaintiffs believe that Defendants have engaged in misleading
10 advertising.

11 In July 2016, Plaintiff Lisa Rosillo purchased a bottle of Annie's Naturals Balsamic
12 Vinaigrette Salad Dressing from a Target store in Apple Valley, California. (*Id.* ¶ 7.) Ms. Rosillo
13 alleges that she was "specifically interested in purchasing natural salad dressing" and, based on the
14 "Annie's Natural" label, believed it was a "natural food product." (*Id.*) Had she known that the
15 product included "non-natural" ingredients, Ms. Rosillo claims she would not have purchased the
16 product. (*Id.*) Plaintiff Jesse Kohn makes similar allegations regarding a bottle of Annie's
17 Naturals Sesame Ginger Vinaigrette Salad Dressing and Annie's Naturals Goddess Dressing he
18 purchased from a Whole Foods store in New York. (*Id.* ¶ 8.)

19 In light of the above, Plaintiffs assert eleven causes of action: (1) Violation of the
20 California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, *et seq.*; (2)
21 violation of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, *et*
22 *seq.*; (3) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
23 17200, *et seq.*; (4) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. §§
24 2301, *et seq.*; (5) violation of New York General Business Law § 349; (6) false advertising in
25 violation of New York General Business Law § 350; (7) breach of express warranty; (8) breach of
26 the implied warranty of merchantability; (9) unjust enrichment; (10) negligent misrepresentation;
27 and (11) fraud.

DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Alternatively, Defendants argue that because the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has commenced regulatory proceedings to explore whether, and to what extent, it should regulate the term "natural" on food labels, the Court should stay this case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Because the Court agrees that a stay is appropriate, the Court need not consider Defendants' arguments relating to the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.

"The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative agency." *Clark v. Time Warner Cable*, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). The doctrine does not require that the court lack jurisdiction, but rather it is a "prudential" doctrine, "under which a court determines that an otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch." *Id.* The determination of whether an action should be stayed pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine is a matter for the Court's discretion. *Syntek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc.*, 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering this issue, courts have "traditionally employed such factors as (1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration." *Id.* (citing *United States v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Defendants contend that a stay is appropriate because in November 2015, the FDA established a docket to "receive information and comments on the use of the term 'natural' in the labeling of human food products." *Use of the Term "Natural" in the Labeling of Human Food Products; Request for Information and Comments*, 80 Fed. Reg. 69905-01, 69905 (Nov. 12, 2015). The FDA invited comments on "when, if ever, the use of the term ["natural"] is false or misleading" and whether the FDA should define the term "natural" or prohibit the use of the term

1 in food labeling. *Id.* at 69908. Additionally, the FDA asked “[s]hould the manner in which an
2 ingredient is produced or sourced affect whether a food containing that ingredient may be labeled
3 as ‘natural?’” *Id.* at 69909. The FDA extended the comment period through May 10, 2016. *See*
4 *Extension of Comment Period*, 80 Fed. Reg. 80718-01, 80719 (Dec. 28, 2015).

5 Consumers have brought numerous cases around the country against food manufacturers,
6 alleging that they have falsely and deceptively labeled their food products as “natural.” In the
7 wake of the FDA’s request for comments regarding the use of the term “natural” on labels, many
8 (but by no means all) of the courts hearing these cases have opted to stay the cases pending
9 completion of the FDA’s regulatory process. After considering the *Syntek* factors, the Court
10 agrees with this approach and concludes that a stay is appropriate.

11 First, this case squarely presents the question of whether, consistent with California’s
12 consumer protection statutes, Defendants could label its products as “natural” despite the presence
13 of xanthan gum. As Plaintiffs point out in their opposition brief this is technically a distinct
14 question from how the FDA chooses to regulate (or not regulate) the term “natural.” California’s
15 consumer protection statutes do not require a consumer to show that a given product was
16 misbranded under federal law. Instead, the plaintiff need only show that the complained of label
17 would be deceptive to a reasonable consumer. *See, e.g., Anderson v. The Hain Celestial Group,*
18 *Inc.*, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Some courts have relied on this to deny
19 motions to stay consumer actions pending the FDA’s actions. *See, e.g., Burton v. Hodgson Mill,*
20 *Inc.*, No. 16-cv-1081-MJR-RJD, 2017 WL 1282882 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017) (“[T]he FDA’s
21 eventual formal definition [of the term ‘natural’] has no bearing on a reasonable consumer’s
22 perception at the time this product was advertised and purchased.”).

23 However, the FDA’s guidance on when, and how, the term “natural” may be used on
24 product labels is relevant to the question of how a “reasonable consumer” would understand that
25 term. Perhaps nothing highlights this relevance more than Plaintiffs’ own amended complaint
26 which cites the FDA’s (and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s) current guidance regarding the
27 term natural to support their allegations that the Defendants’ products are not “natural” and are
28 therefore misleading. (*See* FAC ¶¶ 23-24.) Further, courts have recognized that FDA guidance on

1 the term “natural” is relevant to the question of how a reasonable consumer would understand that
2 term. *See, e.g., Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc.*, No. 12-cv-02554-RMW, 2013 WL 685372, at *12
3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (“The FDA’s 2009 industry guidance statement is relevant to the issue
4 of whether these labels could be deceptive or misleading to a reasonable consumer[.]”); *see also In*
5 *re Kind LLC “Healthy and All Natural” Litig.*, 209 F. Supp. 3d 689, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“FDA
6 Guidance could explain whether ingredients such as soy protein isolate and citrus pectin should be
7 considered ‘natural.’”). Accordingly, because the FDA is currently considering an issue that is
8 highly relevant to the central dispute in this case, the Court finds the first *Syntek* factor weighs in
9 favor of a stay.

10 As for the second and third factors, it cannot be denied that Congress has, through the
11 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301, *et seq.*, subjected food labeling to a
12 comprehensive regulatory framework administered by the FDA. *See, e.g., Figy v. Lifeway Foods,*
13 *Inc.*, No. 13-cv-04828-TEH, 2014 WL 1779251, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (“Congress vested
14 the FDA with comprehensive regulatory authority to address the issue of proper declaration of
15 food labels. The FDCA imposes a comprehensive regulatory framework that requires uniformity
16 in administration.” (citation omitted)); *Reese v. Odwalla, Inc.*, 30 F. Supp. 3d 935 (2014)
17 (“Congress has vested the FDA with regulatory authority over food labeling, charging the agency
18 with creating a uniform national scheme of regulation to ensure that food is labeled in a manner
19 that does not mislead consumers.”).

20 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has found that whether a given ingredient or compound can be
21 classified as “natural” is a “a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to the
22 FDA” and that “[o]btaining expert advice from that agency would help ensure uniformity in
23 administration of the comprehensive regulatory regime established by the FDCA.” *Astiana v. The*
24 *Hain Celestial Group, Inc.*, 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation
25 marks omitted); *see also Kane v. Chobani, LLC*, 645 F. App’x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The
26 delineation of the scope and permissible usage of the term[] ‘natural’ . . . in connection with food
27 products ‘implicates technical and policy questions that should be addressed in the first instance
28 by the agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial

1 branch.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Awaiting guidance from the FDA on
2 the use of the term “natural” on food labels will help ensure that there are not conflicting judicial
3 rulings, indirectly resulting in a patchwork of disclosure requirements which would require
4 manufacturers to print different labels for different states. *In re Kind*, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 696.
5 The fourth *Syntek* factor therefore supports issuance of a stay.

6 Plaintiffs argue, however, that a stay is inappropriate because it is speculative to think the
7 FDA will actually use its rulemaking powers to regulate the term “natural.” Specifically, they
8 argue that the “extended silence” from the FDA since the May 2016 comment closing period
9 suggests new rulemaking is unlikely. The Court is unpersuaded. The Court notes that in a recent
10 bill report accompanying the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
11 Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2018, the Committee on Appropriations included the
12 following statement:

13 *Natural Definition* — The Committee commends the FDA for
14 taking the first step towards defining the term “natural” and
15 regulating its use on food labeling by requesting public comment on
16 a number of relevant questions in a November 2015 Federal
17 Register notice. The Committee directs FDA to provide a report
18 within 60 days of enactment of this Act on the actions and
19 timeframe for defining “natural” so that there is a uniform national
20 standard for the labeling claims and consumers and food producers
21 have certainty about the meaning of the term.

22 H.R. Rep. No. 115-232, at 72 (2017). The appropriations bill remains pending in Congress and,
23 as a result, the FDA’s 60 day deadline for reporting to the committee has not yet commenced.
24 Nonetheless, the Court believes that the congressional interest reflected in this committee report
25 makes it likely that the FDA will address, in a relatively short amount of time, the use of the term
26 “natural” on food labels.

27 CONCLUSION

28 For the foregoing reasons, and after considering the relevant factors, the Court finds that it
is appropriate to stay this action pursuant to the primary jurisdiction.

Accordingly this action is STAYED until the FDA’s regulatory process regarding use of
the term “natural” on food labeling is completed. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to
dismiss without prejudice to Defendants renewing and renoticing the motion once the Court lifts


1 the stay.

2 Within two weeks of the FDA completing its process: (1) Defendant shall renote its
3 motion to dismiss; (2) the parties shall submit a joint status report providing notice of the FDA's
4 action; and (3) the parties shall submit cross-supplemental briefs (not to exceed 10 pages) on
5 Defendants' motion to dismiss to address the impact, if any, on the FDA's new guidance.

6 If the FDA's rulemaking is not complete on January 15, 2018, the parties shall file a joint
7 status report by January 19, 2018 which sets forth the parties' positions (not to exceed five pages
8 per side) on whether the stay should continue.

9 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

10 Dated: October 17, 2017

11 
12 _____
13 JEFFREY S. WHITE
14 United States District Judge

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28